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Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court Should Adopt a New 
Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans.  
 
 
By Leslie Yalof Garfield1
 
When the Supreme Court ordered the City of Birmingham to desegregate its 
schools in 1954,2 it failed to consider the long range implications of its mandate.  School 
districts across the country have responded to the Court’s order by adopting race-
preference school assignment plans, which they created to designate the particular public 
elementary or secondary school a student should attend.  Now that these plans have 
successfully achieved their goals of desegregating classrooms, the question has become 
whether the continuation of the very programs that helped achieve those goals remain 
legal?  In other words, as Justice Ginsburg recently said in arguments before the Supreme 
Court, could it now be that “what’s constitutionally required one day gets constitutionally 
prohibited the next day?”3  This very issue is currently under consideration in the 
Supreme Court.4
                                                 
1 Leslie Yalof Garfield, Prof. of Law, Pace Law School (B.A. Fla. 1982; J.D. Fla 1985) The author would like to 
express deep gratitude to Alison Kronstadt and Megan McDonald  for their wonderful research assistance and 
to David Stuart, for his unselfish willingness to provide outstanding research and sound editorial assistance on 
a moments notice. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Bennett Gershman for his continued support, guidance 
and creative thought. 
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, NY TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).   
4 See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d sub nom., McFarland 
ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Disc. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No. 
01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 
2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 
72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), 
aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
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 In December 2006, the court heard arguments on Meredith v. Jefferson County 
Board of Education5  and on Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle 
School District,6  In each case petitioners challenged long standing school placement 
plans, which allowed limited consideration for racial preference when assigning students 
in grades K-12 to a particular school.7   The Jefferson County Board of Education plan’s 
genesis rests in a court ordered desegregation.8  When petitioners challenged the plan, in 
2002, however, the evidence showed that, in fact, the schools were successfully 
integrated.9  Since there were no present effects of past discrimination, they argued, the 
plan was no longer permissible.10  The Seattle School Board adopted its plan because 
assigning students to schools based on their residential neighborhood resulted in de facto 
segregation in the schools.11 Opponents challenged the Seattle Plan as violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause since it unfairly favored one group based on race.12  
  Justice Breyer, in the Meredith hearings, articulated the grave danger of striking 
down the Jefferson County BOE plan when he asked:  “How could the Constitution the 
day that the decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make efforts any more, it 
can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black schools and 
                                                 
5 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Meredith, No. 05-915 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-915.pdf. See also, Transcript of 
Oral Argument , Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-908.pdf. 
6 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, 
No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 
2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 
72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), 
aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
7 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
8 Id. The plan was developed in response to a 1975 federal court order.  The school chose to continue the 
program of integration after the end of the court mandate. Id. 
9 See id. at 841-42. 
10 See McFarland, 330 F.Supp. at 835, 
11 Parents Involved in Cmty Schs, 426 F.3d at 1169. 
12 Id. 
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white schools?”13  Yet, current law supports doing just that, since the Court has held that 
absent proof of present effects of past discrimination, a court may strike down race 
preference programs. 14    
 As a general matter, the Court can only uphold Equal Protection challenges to 
race-preference plans if the plan survives the strict scrutiny test.15  Under the current law, 
plans will survive if the defending group can show a compelling governmental interest in 
achieving the plans’ goals, which the Court has found can be supported by evidence of 
present effects of past discrimination or by proof that the program will create “viewpoint 
diversity.”16   
Neither the Jefferson County BOE Plan nor the Seattle Plan are likely to survive 
strict scrutiny under the Court’s current compelling governmental interest tests.  First, 
neither defendant can produce evidence that their plans are in place to remedy present 
effects of past discrimination.  Second, while there clearly is viewpoint diversity in 
integrated classrooms, several appellate court judges have raised concern that there is 
little need for viewpoint diversity at the K-12 grade levels since the learning experience 
in elementary and secondary schools is distinguishable from the learning experience at 
the university level.17   
Because the race-preference student assignment plans currently under 
consideration before the Court potentially fail to withstand strict scrutiny, the Court may 
be forced to identify a new socially correct interest that overrides the Equal Protection 
                                                 
13 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 12. 
14 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 363 (1978) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977)). 
15 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
16 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2005), 
17 See infra notes 114-117 and notes 171-186 and accompanying text; see also, Cavalier ex rel. Cavalier v. Caddo 
Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 259 n. 15 (5th Cir. 2005); Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996); but 
see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. , No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004).   
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violation even though those programs were arguably created in same educational context 
as previously considered race-preference admissions plans.18 In Grutter v. Bollinger,19 
Justice O’Connor wrote that “context matters” in evaluating the constitutionality of race-
preference programs.20 The Court must distinguish the context of the plans challenged in 
Meredith and PICS, therefore, in order to justify a new compelling governmental interest.   
 The Court can cast the education race-preference plans at the K-12 level in a 
different context than those at the graduate school level since the educational goals of 
attaining diversity at grades K-12 is easily distinguishable from attaining diversity in 
classrooms of higher education. Under Grutter, identifying a new context justifies 
defining a new compelling governmental interest.    
The Court must articulate a third compelling governmental interest upholding 
race-preference plans or programs where the programs abolishment would threaten a 
return to the de facto segregation that the plans originally sought to cure.  Part I of this 
article will define the historical evolution of the strict scrutiny test and the Court’s 
willingness to allow the context of a particular race-preference issue to drive the 
definition of a compelling governmental interest.  Part II of this article will consider 
appellate court responses to the applicability of the Court’s two articulated compelling 
governmental interests particularly in cases considering challenges to race-preference 
student assignment plans.  Finally, Part III will argue that the Court must create a new 
compelling governmental interest for evaluation of race-preference student assignment 
plans, since invalidation of these School Board plans would cause a return to the social 
conditions that originally necessitated their creation. 
                                                 
18 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2005). 
19 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2005). 
20 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
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1. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test 
 The Supreme Court has long held that any race-preference policy must be subject 
to the strictest scrutiny.21  A policy passes the strict scrutiny test if the governmental 
body defending the policy can demonstrate that there is a compelling governmental 
interest in using the policy and that the policy is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.22  
The Court first used the strict scrutiny test to evaluate a race-preference policy in Regents 
of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke.23   
The Bakke case considered an equal protection challenge to the University of 
California at Davis Medical School’s (“Davis”) 1973 admissions policy, which the school 
adopted in an effort to diversify its entering class.24  Allen Bakke, a white male who had 
been rejected from the school, claimed that the policy, which set aside a number of seats 
for students in identified minority groups,25 violated the Equal Protection Clause,26 the 
California Constitution,27 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”).28  
                                                 
21 See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).  
23 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
24 Id. at 265.  
25 Id. Davis utilized a bifurcated admissions policy. One committee considered nonminority applicants who had 
achieved a minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA (“UGPA”). Id. at 275. A separate committee considered all 
minority applicants, regardless of their objective scores. Id. at 274-75. The school maintained a certain number 
of seats for applicants from each of the groups. Id. at 275. Bakke claimed that the policy, which allowed the 
school to reserve a certain amount of places for minority applicants with lower objective scores than his own, 
was tantamount to a quota. Id. at 277-78. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
27 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not 
granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or 
revoked.”). 
28 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, which held that Davis’ admission policy was a 
racial quota and therefore violated the California and United States Constitution, as well as Title VI.  The 
California Supreme Court affirmed, and upon the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States took 
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Petitioner, the Regents of the University of California, argued that the Davis program 
should not be subject to the strict scrutiny test for two reasons.  First, Petitioner argued, 
white males are not members of a discrete and insular minority group and as such do not 
require extraordinary protection.29  Secondly, petitioner pointed out that in instances 
where race was a factor, such as school and employment desegregation, the Court did not 
always subject the challenged program or policy to strict scrutiny.30  The Bakke case was 
the first of its kind to raise the issue of reverse discrimination. The court concluded that 
because the Davis program involved the use of an explicit racial classification the 
program’s preferential treatment potentially disregarded individual rights as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.31  When a program touches upon “an individual’s race or 
ethnic background,: Justice Powell wrote, “he is entitled to a judicial determination that 
the burden he is asked to bear . . . is precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.”32     
The Court’s language became the embodiment of the strict scrutiny test.33  Any 
program or policy that had a direct impact on an individual because of race, regardless of 
membership in a minority class, would be subject to the most exacting review.   Under 
                                                                                                                                                 
certiorari.  The Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, eventually affirmed 
the California Supreme Court’s decision. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271. 
29 Id. at 278. 
30 The Davis special admissions program involves the use of   
an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants 
who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific 
percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, 
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational 
diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred 
groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the 
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class. 
Id. at 319-20.  
31 Id. at 320 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). 
32 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 
(1938).  In “order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S at 22).
 6
Bakke, the party promoting the challenged race-preference program would have to 
demonstrate that there was a compelling governmental interest in the program and that 
the program was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.34
      The Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion, struck down the Davis policy.  
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that the Davis program violated both 
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.35  Applying the strict scrutiny test,36 Justice 
Powell found that there was a compelling governmental interest in attaining a diverse 
student body.37  However, while the Constitution does not bar admission policies from 
introducing race as a factor in the selection process, Justice Powell concluded that the 
program was not narrowly tailored and that preferring members of any one group for no 
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own.38  The Davis 
admissions policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for students in identified 
minority groups, unfairly benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense of 
other innocent individuals, and therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause.39    
Justice Powell, therefore, concluded that the Davis admissions policy was constitutionally 
impermissible. 
      The Bakke Court was the first to conclude that programs designed to achieve 
diversity at the graduate school level served a compelling governmental interest.  40  
Indeed, a majority of the Bakke Court recognized the University’s Constitutional right to 
                                                 
34 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. 
35 Id. at 270-71. 
36 Id. at 299. 
37 Id. at 311-12.  A diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally 
permissible goal on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated.  Id. 
38 Id. at 307. 
39 Id. Additionally, its practice of having separate admissions subcommittees review minority and non-minority 
candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from comparison against the entire admissions pool. Id. at 315. 
40 Id. at 317. 
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select students who would best contribute to the “‘robust exchange of ideas.’ ”41  Ethnic 
diversity, however, is one element in a range of factors a university may properly 
consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.42  Justice Powell’s edict 
would come to be called “viewpoint diversity”43and would hold that evidence that a race-
preference admission program was designed to create viewpoint diversity was sufficient 
to support a court finding of a compelling governmental interest.  
 Almost a decade after Bakke, the Court began reviewing a series of challenges to 
race-preference policies  in the workplace.44 These cases, read together, articulated clear 
guidelines for the application of the strict scrutiny test45 and confirmed that a reviewing 
court could only uphold an affirmative action program or policy in the work place if it 
was aimed at ameliorating present effects of past discrimination and if the program was 
narrowly tailored to meet that goal.46
                                                 
41 Id. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
42 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined in Justice 
Powell’s opinion that the program was invalid because it violated Title VI, and thus, there was no need to 
evaluate the program under the Equal Protection Clause. See id, at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun were in the minority, 
concluding that Title VI permits federally-funded entities to enact programs or policies that assist minority 
groups to gain equal access to programs more easily available to Caucasians.  Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring 
in the judgment and dissenting in part). However, Title VI and the Civil Rights Act do not take precedence 
over the constitutional protection of the Equal Rights Clause, and thus, such programs or policies are valid 
only to the extent that they are coterminous with the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 340 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.) Thus, because four Justices chose to limit the extent of their 
agreement with Justice Powell’s conclusion, Justice Powell’s scrutiny of the Davis Policy under the Equal 
Protection Clause became, in a sense, a majority of one. 
43  Judge Friedman, writing for the The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, first identified the  
term “viewpoint diversity” in the context of race-prefernce programs.   Diversty viewpoint means  “a diversity 
of viewpoints, experiences, interests, perspectives, and backgrounds which creates an atmosphere most 
conducive to learning.” Grutter v. Bolinger, 137 F. Supp 821, 849 
44 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986).    
45 See generally Paradise, 480 U.S. 149; see also id. at 171 (citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n v. 
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986)) (listing several factors to consider in determining the appropriateness of 
race-conscious guidelines, “including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the 
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the 
numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.”). 
46 See Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (holding that courts must apply the strict scrutiny test to judicial review of state and 
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      In the first post-Bakke decision to consider the constitutionality of affirmative 
action admission policies, Justice Powell, again writing for the plurality, took the 
opportunity to reaffirm the requirement that these programs pass the strict scrutiny test 
before a court may pronounce them as constitutional.47  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education,48 the Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board 
of Education and a teachers’ union that provided for layoffs by seniority where the 
percentage of minorities laid off would exceed the percentage of minorities employed at 
the time.49   In this instance, the Court found, that the government’s interest in reversing 
the trend of societal discrimination was not sufficient to support a compelling 
governmental interest.50  The Court struck down the policy for violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment, holding that “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental 
unit involved” is required before limited use of racial classifications is allowed in order to 
remedy discrimination.51  
      The Court took the opportunity to reaffirm its position on what evidence would 
support a compelling governmental interest in the next Equal Protection challenge to a 
race preference policy, when it decided United States v. Paradise.52  The court in 
Paradise considered the constitutionality of a one-black-to-one-white promotion plan that 
                                                                                                                                                 
local government affirmative action programs); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (mandating the use of the strict 
scrutiny test for federal race-preference preference programs).  See generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring 
Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & 
U.L. 895 (1996). 
47 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.  Justice Powell widely cited Bakke in his decision. 
48 Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
49 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.  Justice Powell wrote that where race-preference programs are concerned, the racial 
classification must be justified by “a compelling state purpose . . . .  [and] the means chosen by the State to 
effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored.” Id. at 274.  The school board's policy of extending 
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
50 Id. at 274-75. 
51 Id. at 274. 
52 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
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the Alabama Department of Public Safety adopted pursuant to a district court consent 
decree.53  Relying on Wygant, Justice Brennan wrote that the court will always find a 
compelling governmental interest where the entity promoting the policy can demonstrate 
that it is designed to remedy present effects of past discrimination.54   
      Following Paradise, the Court was faced with several more challenges to 
affirmative action programs aimed at eradicating discrimination in the workplace and in 
each instance..55  In City of Richmond v. Croson,56 which considered a municipal plan 
that required a primary city contractor to award 30% of the amount of its contract to 
Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs), defined as subcontractor businesses owned by 
members of certain minority groups.57  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena58 the 
Supreme Court  extended the strict scrutiny standard of review to federal race-preference 
preference programs.59  Both Adarand and Croson confirmed that there is acompelling 
                                                 
53 Id. at 154-55. 
54 Id. at 183-85.  In Wygant, the Majority also turned its attention to the definition of “narrowly tailored, 
acknowledging that it had not previously defined precisely what “narrowly tailored” meant. ,  In evaluating 
whether a program was narrowly tailored, the court must look at:  (1) “the necessity for the relief and the 
efficacy of alternative remedies;” (2) “the flexibility and duration of the relief;” (3) “the relationship between 
the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;” and (4) “the impact of the relief on the rights of third 
parties.” Id. at 171 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986) and Sheet Metal Workers, 478 
U.S. at 486 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 
487 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court would not uphold a benign race-
preference remedial policy unless the policy was the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the 
goals of the entity’s program.  See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266 (1978); but 
see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (where the Court said that “narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every race neutral alternative.”). 
55 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469; see also, Garfield, supra 
note 47. 
56  Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
57 Id. at 478. Justices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and Scalia agreed with that portion of the opinion, concurring. 
Id. at 475. 
58 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. 
59 Id.  Adarand considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that granted financial incentives to prime 
contractors who awarded subcontracts to companies controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals.  Id. at 206-07.  Prior to Adarand, Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), was the precedent.  
Metro Broadcasting held that “benign” federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.  See 
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564-65.  Justice O’Connor suggested that the need for intermediate scrutiny may have 
evolved from the principle that the Fifth Amendment does not protect individual rights to the same extent as 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213.  This was in sharp contrast to the Court’s requirement 
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governmental interest in eradicating present effects of past discrimination.   
 In 2003, the Court, for the first time in 25 years, revisited the constitutionality of 
race-preference programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom.  Grutter v. 
Bollinger and its companion case Gratz v. Bollinger60 considered the constitutionality of 
affirmative action admission programs at the University of Michigan School of Law 
(Law School) and the University of Michigan Literature Science and Arts School (LSA) 
respectively.  In each instance, the Supreme Court concluded that the particulars of the 
strict scrutiny test it applied in Wygant and Paradise was ill-suited for evaluating the 
present challenges.   
Plaintiffs in Gratz61 challenged LSA’s admissions policy, alleging that it 
improperly used race as a factor, in violation of sections 1981 and 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act,62 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63  The 
school used a 150-point scale, to rate applicants.  Applicants were assigned a number of 
points for scholarship, curriculum, under-represented minority status, geographical 
location, and alumni relation.  Students were assigned twenty points if they were under-
represented minorities.64  The admissions committee limited its review to applicants who 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of “benign” state or local race-preference preference 
policies. See id. at 222. A majority of the Adarand court overruled Metro Broadcasting, holding that the more 
stringent standard should apply to all race-preference preference policies, regardless of who implements the 
policy.   Id. at 227.  The strict scrutiny test “ensures that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has 
not been infringed.”  Id. 
60 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
61 Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher “both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s 
(University) College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the State of Michigan.  Both 
petitioners are Caucasian.” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251. Both were told that they were qualified but not sufficiently to 
be admitted for “first review.” Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 109a).  Both were later denied admission and 
attended alternate universities.  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2006).   
63 Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 210 (E.D. Mich. 1998).  The complaint was filed on October, 14, 1997.  
Id.  
64 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827 & n. 27 (E.D. Mich. 2000). LSA did not set aside a fixed number 
of seats for applicants. Id. at 827.
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attained a certain SCUGA number.65  The District Court upheld the program and 
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.66
Concurrent with the court’s consideration of Gratz, Barbara Grutter challenged 
the Law School’s admissions policy, whose mission statement called for enrollment of a 
“critical mass of minority students” as a means of ensuring a diverse student body.67  
Under the written policy, those reviewing applications for admission were encouraged to 
consider factors including recommendations, quality of one’s undergraduate institution, 
essays, course selection, and whether the applicant had a perspective or experience that 
would contribute to a diverse student body.68  The District Court struck down the Law 
                                                 
65 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.  Once an applicant earned enough points to make it to the individual review phase 
of the admissions policy, the committee disregarded the applicant’s SCUGA score.  Id.  Rather, it paid 
particular attention to the qualities that would make the candidate a suitable student for matriculation at the 
school.  Id.  LSA also had a policy of allowing counselors to “flag” applications of certain students who would 
otherwise not have passed the first selection procedure, allowing for a limited number of applicants, who did 
not have the necessary SCUGA score, to be considered in the individual review phase of the admissions 
proceedings.  Id.  The SCUGA factors were: S-socioeconomic status, C-curriculum, U-underrepresented 
minority, G-geography, A-alumni.  Id.   
 The faculty at the University of Michigan had adopted its admissions policy to accomplish its stated 
goal of admitting a diverse class, for the benefit of all students in the classroom.  See Gratz , 122 F. Supp. 2d at 
814.  From 1995 to 1998, LSA’s admissions policy specifically “protected” a certain number of spots for 
minority candidates.  Id.at 831. In 1999, LSA modified its admissions program to the challenged program. Id. at 
827.  Applicants with SCUGA scores below a threshold number were automatically rejected from the school.  
See id. at 827. 
66  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  The Supreme Court found that the school’s program was not  
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse classroom.  Id. at 275.
67  Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Law School’s admissions policy was 
adopted in 1992 and it expresses the school’s desire “to admit a group of students who individually and 
collectively are among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given year . . . .  
Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn 
from each other.”  Id. at 825.  The law school hoped that “[b]y enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of minority students, 
we have ensured their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School.”  Id. at 828. 
68  Id. at 826-28.  The Law School gave considerable weight to the objective factors of an applicant’s 
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores. See id. at 827. The rationale for admitting students with lower scores was 
that they “may help achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make 
a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.”  Id. at 827.  The law school hoped that “[b]y enrolling a 
‘critical mass’ of minority students, we have ensured their ability to make unique contributions to the character 
of the Law School.”  Id. at 828.  According to the Law School’s written policy, those who could offer varying 
perspectives, including a concert pianist, someone who spoke five languages, or a member of an 
underrepresented minority group, were considered for admission despite their low objective scores.  Id. at 826-
27.
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School policy finding that it did not survive the strict scrutiny test.69  In response to the 
District Court decision, the Law School petitioned the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the 
lower court. 70   
The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari in both the Grutter and Gratz 
cases71  Because the plaintiffs in each case challenged the respective affirmative action 
admissions policies as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the Court reviewed each 
policy under the strict scrutiny test.72    The Court in both Grutter and Gratz swiftly 
accepted, as binding, Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bakke, and presumed that there 
was a compelling governmental interest in achieving a diverse entering class.73   
The majority in Grutter upheld the Law School’s affirmative action policy.  
Justice O’Connor, early pronouncement that “context matters” when reviewing race-
preference  governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause set the stage for 
distinguishing its findings in these decision from those in the most recently considered 
                                                 
69 The District Court concluded that Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke was not binding, and therefore 
the Law School’s mission of admitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmental interest to justify 
including race in the list of non-objective factors that could contribute to an applicant’s success.  See id. at 847-
48.  The court held that Bakke is not binding, because Justice Powell’s opinion was not joined by any other 
Justices, and recent Supreme Court cases have not looked favorably on racial classifications.  Id. at 844-46.  The 
court agreed that diversity does have important educational benefits, but felt that a distinction needs to be 
drawn between viewpoint diversity and racial diversity.  Id. at 849.  The court felt that viewpoint diversity 
provides benefits but that the connection between race and viewpoint is tenuous.  Id.  Therefore, racial 
diversity is not a compelling interest.  Id. at 850.  The U.S. District Court further found that the admissions 
policy was not narrowly tailored, concluding that the policy failed under the third prong of the narrowly 
tailored test since the Law School’s goal of admitting a “critical mass” was practically indistinguishable from a 
quota, and was such an amorphous figure that a program could never be narrowly tailored to achieve it.  Id. at 
850-51.   
70 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306. 
(2003).  The main issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the District Court erred in concluding that Justice 
Powell’s definition of a compelling governmental interest was binding. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 738-39.   
71 Gratz, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (granting cert.); Grutter, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002) (granting cert.).     
72 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.  The policies, , would only withstand a constitutional 
challenge if the schools could “demonstrate that the use of race in [their] current admissions program[s] 
employ ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).  
73 Despite all of the controversy and varying opinions among the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not 
spend a significant amount of time addressing the issue in their opinion.  The Court simply stated that “today 
we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.  
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cases of Wygant, Adarand and the like. 74  Justice O’Connor justified the different test as 
permissible because, she wrote, “not every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully 
examining the importance and the sincerity of the governments reasons for using race in a 
particular context.”75
The Grutter majority reaffirmed Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke, that 
achieving diversity in education supports a finding of a compelling governmental 
interest.76  It then turned its attention to whether the policy was narrowly tailored to meet 
that interest.  The majority acknowledged the need for a modified version of the Paradise 
test, holding that the “inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use 
of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education.”77  Consequently, 
the Court found that it was perfectly appropriate for courts to fashion a unique narrowly 
tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test in light of the particular context of the challenged 
program.  In this instance, the Court held, in order to more fairly  in order to pass the 
narrowly tailored test, the party defending an affirmative action admissions program need 
only demonstrate that the program was flexible and non-mechanical, and limited in its 
duration.78  Ultimately, the Court found that the Law School program was not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.79
                                                 
74 Id. at 327; see also Jeramy R. Green, Affirmative Action: Challenges and Opportunities, 2004 BYU EDUC. L.J. 139, 
149-151 (2004). 
75 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.   
76 Id. “Attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that 
‘good faith’ on the part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent [in] a showing to the contrary.”  Id. at 330.  “Skills 
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”  Id. at 330.
77  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
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In contrast, the Gratz Court struck down LSA’s admissions policy because it was 
not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse 
student body.80   LSA’s policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell’s edict that race 
can be considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to allow for interpretation of 
“individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated 
with it.”81  Therefore, the program was not narrowly drawn in a constitutionally 
permissible way.82
The Court clearly articulated the permissibility of fashioning a compelling governmental 
interest test that was best suited for evaluating affirmative action policies aimed at 
achieving diversity in institutes of higher education. Consequently, the Court can 
evaluate a race-preference action against a test that is best suited to evaluate the particular 
                                                 
80 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268-69.  Before the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the case, they spent 
considerable time discussing whether the plaintiff had standing to bring the case.  Id. at 260-68 .  In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens—who was joined by Justice Souter—contended that the case should be 
dismissed because the plaintiff’s lacked standing.  Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In reaching its conclusion, 
the Supreme Court chose not to apply the four-pronged narrowly tailored test it had previously articulated in 
Paradise.  
81 Id. at 272 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324).  Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected LSA’s argument that the policy’s 
individual review system, which was triggered after the points were assigned, satisfied the Court’s requirement 
that a narrowly tailored policy allow for individual review. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-76.   See generally, The Cost of 
Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision Upholding Affirmative Action Admission Programs is 
Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15 (Fall 2006). 
82 Id. at 275.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the University’s 
admissions policy was its failure to provide an individual review of each candidate.  Id. at 272-74.  LSA’s policy 
of automatically distributing 20 points to every applicant from the “under-represented minority” applicant pool 
had the result of treating race as an absolute, which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group into 
the accepted category, regardless of the experiences or qualities that race had contributed to the development 
of the individual.  Id. at 274. See also, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (witing that  LSA’s practice of assigning points 
to applicants merely because they are members of a particular class precluded the committee from considering 
the effect race had on the individual, and his or her ability to contribute to meaningful class discussion.) Id. at 
278-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring);   Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, (Thomas, J., concurring). The 
policy failed to permit admissions counselors the ability to identify and consider non-racial distinctions among 
underrepresented minority applicants.  Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding that found LSA’s policy flawed 
because “it awards all underrepresented minorities the same racial preference.”)  Id. at 281. But see, (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Souter chose not to address the issue of whether LSA’s policy was narrowly tailored, and 
criticized the rest of the Court for passing on that issue.  According to Justice Souter, (the issue before the 
Court was essentially moot because the Plaintiff who brought the suit was a transfer student, and not subject to 
LSA’s entering class admissions policy.) Id. at 393;  (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)(arguing that there is a compelling 
need for such policies, and wide latitude should be given when interpreting whether the policies are narrowly 
tailored. ) Id. at 302-03 
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interest sought to be accomplished by a governmental entity.83  The Court’s decision to 
uphold the Law School’s policy not only identified for the first time a permissible 
affirmative action policy in the context of education but it also gave the lower courts 
license to design different “frameworks” for evaluating affirmative action policies 
depending on the need for a particular program.           
In 2005, in Johnson v. California,84  Court concluded that the context in which a 
policy is applied will dictate an appropriate definition of strict scrutiny.85  The Johnson 
court considered whether the strict scrutiny test applies to an Equal Protection challenge 
to the California Department of Correction’s (CDC) “unwritten policy of racially 
segregating prisoners in double cells in reception centers for up to 60 days each time they 
enter a new correctional facility.”86  Without reaching the merits,87 the Court clearly 
stated that “all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny,” even when their effects equally burden or benefit 
the members of the races involved.88  The Court rejected CDC’s argument that it should 
be exempt from a strict scrutiny analysis because prisoners are equally segregated.89   
                                                 
83 Id.  Justice O’Connor wrote that “not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.”  Id.  
84 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).   
85 Summary Judgment granted for CDC and defendant appealed claiming that the District Court’s failure to 
apply strict scrutiny was an inappropriate review. The Ninth Circuit recognized that in this case the standard of 
review is paramanout but ultimately held that because this case considered the constituionaly right of prisoners, 
a more deferential review was appropriate. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003); see Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that when a prison regulation infringes on an inmate’s constitutional 
rights, the defending party need only show that the regulation is reasonably related to some legitimate 
penalogical interest.) Id. at 89. but see, id at 100 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing 
that a reasonableness standard fives prison officials too much discretion in determining what regulations to 
impose.) 
86 Id. at 502.  Garrison Johnson, an African American inmate, brought suit against CDC.  In every instance of 
incarceration, Johson was placed in a double cell with another African American inmate.  The CDC houses 
Japanese-American inmates and Chinese Americans separately, as well as, Northern Hispanics and Southern 
Hispanics.  In each instance, the inmates were held for not more than 60 days.Id. The CDC justified this policy 
as necessary to prevent gang violence. Id.  
87 “We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 505. 
88 Id. at 505 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
89 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506. 
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Although the Court did not define the what evidence might justify a compelling 
governmental interest in dividing inmates by race, or evidence that CDC’s program was 
narrowly tailored it held that “strict scrutiny applies in every context, “even for so-called 
‘benign’ racial classifications, such as race conscious university admissions policies.”90  
The Court’s language suggests that a different strict scrutiny test might be appropriate for 
evaluating a race-preference policy in the context of prisoner’s rights.  
 Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurrence with which Justices Souter and Breyer 
joined.  Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court that strict scrutiny properly applies to 
any and all racial classifications.91  Citing her opinions in Grutter and Gratz, Justice 
Ginsberg held that “the same standard of review ought not to control judicial inspection 
of every official race classification.”92  In her opinion, actions aimed at ameliorating 
present effects of past discrimination (actions designed to burden group’s long denied full 
citizenship stature)93 should be subject to a more exacting scrutiny than those measures 
that are adopted as a result of the “after effects” of discrimination.94  Under this analysis, 
not only does context dictate a governmental entities justification for the compelling 
governmental interest, it would dictate whether the strict scrutiny test was applicable at 
all.  
As a general matter, Courts considering Equal Protection Challenges to race-
preference policies have only found compelling governmental interests in two instances, 
                                                 
90 Id. at 505 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger,  539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).   
91 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
92 Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).  
93 Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
94 See id. at 516 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented writing that the CDC program violates the 
Equal Protection clause under any test. Id. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, with whom Justice 
Scalia joined in dissenting, wrote that “the Constitution has always demanded less within the prison walls,” and 
for this reason, he would apply Turner’s less stringent deferential test. Id. at 524, 530 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
However, in reaching his conclusion, Justice Thomas was not without criticizing the majority for ruling in a 
manner that contradicted its findings in Grutter and Gratz.  See id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting).    
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where   programs are aimed at ameliorating present effects of past discrimination in the 
workplace, and where programs are aimed at creating a diverse learning environment in 
the classroom.  The Johnson opinion, particularly Justice Ginsburg’s finding that “the 
same standard of review ought not to control judicial inspection of every official race 
classification,”95 suggests it is permissible to broaden acceptable findings of a compelling 
governmental interest.  As a result, the body of case law that considered Equal Protection 
challenges to race-preference programs leaves room for lower courts to conclude that the 
present strict scrutiny test can be even further reconstituted.  As lower courts begin to 
consider challenges beyond those programs that are created for the workplace or for 
higher education, Justice O’Connor’s edict that “context matters” has arguably, opened a 
pandora’s box, allowing courts define compelling governmental interests that best suit 
their desired results 
III. Lower Court evaluation of Race Preference Policies. 
Scholars observing the Court’s evaluation of affirmative action admission policies 
could easily argue that the Court neatly divided treatment of policies into two 
categories.96  When evaluating affirmative action policies in the workplace, the Court has 
applied the Paradise test.  When evaluating affirmative action for higher education, the 
Court has applied the Grutter test.97  The Johnson court’s holding, however, suggests that 
when the context changes, so can the strict scrutiny test, even beyond these two neatly 
fashioned groups.98
                                                 
95 Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
96 See, e.g., Leslie Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at 
Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REV. 631 (2005).  
97 See id.   
98 Although the circuits seem to adhere to the Wygant/Paradise construct when considering affirmative action in 
the workplace, recent district court decisions indicate that these courts recognize that the context of a particular 
challenge does drive the strict scrutiny definition.  Both the District Court of Florida and the District Court of 
 18
Recent decisions in the several circuits confirm that the Paradise “narrowly 
tailored” test remains the controlling law when evaluating Equal Protection challenges to 
affirmative action policies aimed at promoting diversity in the workplace.99  In Dean v. 
City of Shreveport, appellants, two white males to whom the Shreveport Fire Department 
denied employment,  challenged the fire department’s hiring process, which  placed 
applicants into separate lists according to race and sex.100  The fire department policy, 
which it adopted to comply with a Department of Justice consent decree issued by the 
Department of Justice required the department to have the same proportion of blacks in 
its department, “as blacks . . . bear to the appropriate work force in the particular 
jurisdiction.”101  Considering whether the District Court wrongly granted summary 
judgment, the Fifth   Circuit held that remedying past discrimination is a compelling 
government interest and thus the City met the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.  The 
Court remanded, however, for findings of whether the program was narrowly tailored.102  
                                                                                                                                                 
Illinois have heard equal protection challenges to minority set aside programs within the context of the 
construction industry. See,    Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami Dade County, Fla., 333 F. Supp 2d 
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that “context matters” and recognizing the difference in context between the 
Grutter and Gratz decisions and the instant case.  (“context  [nevertheless] matters” when reviewing such 
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.” Citing Grutter   123 S.Ct. at 2338. The same goes for gender 
preferences. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26, 102 S.Ct. 3331.”) Id. at 1326; See also Builders Ass’n of Greater 
Chicago v. City of Chicago, 298 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill  2003) 
99 See, e.g., Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 464 (5th Cir. 2006); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dept. 
of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 2003).   
100 Dean, 438 F.3d at 452. 
101 Id. at 459. 
102 Id. In Biondo v. City of Chicago, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3463 (N.D. Ill. 2002), witness excluded by 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9816 (N.D. Ill. 2002), judgment entered by Cloud v. City of Chicago, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9817 
(N.D. Ill. 2002), judgment vacated and remanded by Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004), reh’g 
denied and reh’g en banc denied by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20402 (2004), cert. denied by 543 U.S. 1152 (2005), the fire 
department argued that its use of lists separating whites and minorities was in an effort to comply with federal 
regulations that discouraged the use of standardized tests for promotions in strict sequence. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 
683. The Biondo court rejected the City’s compelling government interest, highlighting that racial quotas would 
be commonplace in public employment if preventing disparate impact by the use of a minorities only list 
served a compelling government interest. See id. at 684. The court ultimately held that the fire department’s 
practices did not pass strict scrutiny. Id. In one of the most recent cases, Kohlbek v. City of Omaha, Neb., 447 
F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit held that an affirmative action plan that considered race for 
promotional decisions was not narrowly tailored because the use of racial classifications applied in instances 
where there was no identified past discrimination.  Id. at 556. In the narrowly tailored analysis, the Kohlbek court 
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Relying on the Wygant/Paradise strict scrutiny test, the Eighth Circuit in 
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Dept. of Transportation.103concluded that the 
Transportation Equity Act (TEA) did not violate equal protection as applied in the states 
of Minnesota and Nebraska. Plaintiffs in Sherbrooke challenged the constitutionality of 
the TEA, which authorizes the use of race-preference preferences in federally funded 
transportation contracts.104  The circuit court found a compelling government interest in 
ensuring that government funding was not distributed in a fashion that perpetuated the 
effects of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry. Applying the Paradise 
factors, the court further concluded that the TEA was narrowly tailored based on the 
states’ findings. As a result, the act, as applied, passed constitutional muster.105    
   The circuits seem to adopt the Grutter narrowly tailored test when evaluating 
affirmative action admission policies used to create a diverse classroom environment.106  
The Ninth Circuit determined the law school admissions policy at the University of 
Washington was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of educational 
diversity in Smith v. University of Washington.107  In deciding the case, the Smith court 
                                                                                                                                                 
considered the following factors set forth in Paradise: “ efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and 
duration of the race-conscious remedy, the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and 
the impact of the remedy on third parties.” Id. at 555 (citing Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 971).       
103 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964.  
104 W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dept. of Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied by sub nom. 
City of Vancouver v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 1332 (2006), on remand to sub nom. W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. 
Washington State Dept. of Transp., No. C00-5204 RBL, 2006 WL 1734163 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2006); 
Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964. 
105 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964. The Court was particularly comfortable with the relationship between the 
numerical goals and the relevant labor market; by focusing on the statistical evidence provided by the states. Id. 
at 973-974; see also, W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d 983 (finding that there was not sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that minorities suffer or have suffered discrimination in the Washington transportation 
contracting industry and concluding that the TEA as applied in the state of Washington was not narrowly 
tailored). 
106 Smith v. University of Washington, 923 F.3d 367; but see, Hopwood v. Texas78 F.3d 932 (C.A.5 1996) 
(Hopwood I) (holding that diversity is not a compelling state interest)  
107 Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004).  For the relevant years, the law school received 
approximately 2,000 applications for 165 positions.  Id. at 370.  The top 250-300 applicants based on 
undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score were considered “presumptive admits.”  Id.  The remaining 
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performed an extensive analysis of the Grutter decision, explaining that the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy provided a template for an admissions plan 
that passed constitutional muster.108          
Plaintiffs in Smith argued that the law school’s admissions policy was not 
narrowly tailored because (1) the admissions office supposedly sent an “ethnicity 
substantiation letter” to some minority applicants,109 (2) application evaluators gave 
Asian Americans a plus,110 and (3) a large number of white applicants were referred to 
the Admissions Committee as opposed to being admitted directly by an administrator.111  
The court addressed each of these arguments and ultimately rejected them finding that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
applicants were considered “presumptive denies.”  Id.  Presumptive admits were reviewed by the admissions 
coordinator and were either admitted or referred to the Admissions Committee for further consideration.  Id.  
The presumptive denies were reviewed by the assistant dean who either admitted, denied, or referred applicants 
to an Admissions Committee.  Id.  The Admissions Committee ranked the top 250 to 300 candidates requiring 
committee referral, and the top picks were admitted.  Id.  
108 Id. at 372. 
109 The law school sent an ethnicity substantiation letter to some applicants who identified themselves as 
minorities on their application. Id. at 376-77. The letter asked applicants to provide additional information on 
“family background (including country of origin), languages spoken, official or governmental status (for Native 
Americas), and cultural activities and associations.” Id. at 377. The school argued this information was used to 
ascertain whether the applicant’s race or ethnicity should be considered a plus factor. Id. The court held that the 
letter allowed the school to give preference to those minority students whose race had made a significant 
impact on their lives, rather than giving preference to minority students based solely on race. Id. The court 
concluded that the letter supported, rather than undermined, the constitutionality of the admissions program. 
Id. 
110 The plaintiffs further argued that the school’s plan was not narrowly tailored since Asian Americans were 
given a plus, and the school could have attracted a critical mass of Asian American students (7-9%) without the 
plus. Id. at 378. The court rejected this argument and deferred to the school’s interest in achieving diversity 
among Asian Americans for its preeminent Asian law program. Id. The court further noted that Grutter did not 
establish a number or range of percentages that constituted a critical mass, and the plaintiffs did not provide 
any support that critical mass is achieved at 7-9%. Id. at 379. The court concluded the admissions policy was 
not unconstitutional simply because Asian Americans were given a plus. Id. 
111 Id. at 370. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the plan was not narrowly tailored since a large number of white 
applicants were referred to the Admissions Committee rather than being directly admitted by an administrator. 
Id. at 380. In 1994, 22 minority only applications were pulled from the discretionary group that was supposed to 
be sent to the Admissions Committee. Id. While the court said this was suspect on its face, the school provided 
a reasonable explanation - to make an expedited decision and actively recruit these minority students. Id. 
Notably, the school abandoned this practice after 1994 because it was unsuccessful. Id. The court further 
concluded that it was not surprising that a large number of white applicants were sent to the Admissions 
Committee rather than being directly admitted since white applicants were approximately 69-74% of total 
applicants. Id. at 381. Moreover, applicants sent to the Admissions Committee were not at a disadvantage since 
they received an additional holistic review of their application. Id. Thus, the law school’s system of review did 
not establish a constitutional violation of equal protection, and the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. Id. 
at 382. 
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law school’s admissions program was narrowly tailored to serve the school’s compelling 
interest in attaining a  diverse student body. 112               
      The most problematic cases concerning the “context matters” language are recent 
cases in the circuit courts that concern affirmative action admission policies in 
elementary and secondary education. 113  The circuit courts in these cases have used the 
context matters language of Grutter to justify the use of a strict scrutiny test that is 
distinct from the Supreme Court’s test it used for evaluating affirmative action admission 
policies in higher education.  This dichotomy is troublesome because it suggests that 
courts will further splinter affirmative action challenges, currently segregated by 
workplace and education into even smaller subsets in the educational arena.  
 In Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, the First Circuit upheld a voluntary race-
preference transfer policy for elementary and secondary public schools.114  Parents of 
Lynn Massachusetts School children challenged the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act 
(RIA), which took race into account when determining a student’s ability to transfer out 
of a neighborhood school.115  Students were permitted to make desegregative transfers;116 
students were not permitted to make segregative transfers.  If a transfer request was 
denied, a student had the opportunity to appeal.117  Given its structure, the Lynn School 
                                                 
112 Id.  “…the program was not rendered violative of the Equal Protection clause because of the school’s use of 
an “ethnicity substantiation letter,” id. at 377; “awarding preference to Asian applicants did not violate the equal 
protection clause” id. at 379-380; and a “separate track” procedure for “discretionary” applicants did not violate 
the equal protection clause.” Id. at 381. 
113 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Disc., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 2004).  
114 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6. 
115 Id. at 7. 
116 Id. at 8. Desegregative transfers allow for a white student to transfer out of a racially isolated school and into 
a racially imbalanced school or for a nonwhite student to transfer out of a racially imbalanced school and into a 
racially isolated school.  Id. 
117 Id.  Successful appeals often involve medical concerns, safety issues, and the prevention of siblings in 
separate schools.  Id.  Approximately half of all appeals are granted.  Id. 
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District’s implementation of the RIA had the possibility of resulting in the unequal 
treatment of students based solely on race.118
In challenging the RIA, plaintiff’s argued that the Grutter definition of a 
compelling governmental interest was inapplicable since the Grutter Court considered 
diversity in the context of higher education, which supported a compelling governmental 
interest in “viewpoint diversity.”119  The benefits of viewpoint diversity, plaintiff’s 
argued, did not flow to racial diversity in the context of elementary and secondary 
education.120  The court rejected this argument, noting that there is no basis for 
concluding the benefits of racial diversity are limited to viewpoint diversity or that these 
benefits are stronger in higher education.121  The differences do not negate a compelling 
government interest; rather, they are the “logical result of context.”122  Using Grutter as 
an analytical framework, the court upheld the Lynn plan.123  
 In his concurring opinion, Judge Boudin noted that the Lynn Plan was 
substantially different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously 
addressed and therefore, the context was different than that of the Grutter and Gratz 
decisions. The Lynn Plan was adopted to promote student safety and attendance, where 
                                                 
118 Id.  In the following example, a white student and an African-American student are assigned to the same 
“racially isolated” neighborhood school.  Id.  If both students request a transfer to a racially imbalanced school, 
the white student will be allowed to transfer, and the African-American student will not be allowed to transfer.  
Id.    
119 Id. at 16. See supra note __. . 
120 Id. at 15 (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852-53 (W.D. Ky. 2004)).  
121 See Comfort, 418 F.3d at 15. 
122 Id. at 16.  “But it is natural that safety and attendance issues will loom larger in elementary and secondary 
schools than in graduate schools. Conversely, lively classroom discussion is a more central form of learning in 
law schools (which prefer the Socratic method) than in a K-12 setting. These differences do not negate a 
compelling interest in racial diversity in a K-12 setting. Instead, they are the logical result of context.” Id.
123 Id. at 22.  Applying the strict scrutiny test, the court found a compelling government interest in the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body and that the program was narrowly tailored because it did not 
pursue a quota, did not “unduly harm members of any racial group;” and monitors demographics for diversity 
in order to uphold the durational requirement mandated by Grutter.. Id.  
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as the graduate school programs were adopted to promote “viewpoint diversity.”124 
“Where the outcome in the Supreme Court is uncertain and past pronouncements were 
made in contexts different than the [context] now presented,” he wrote, “the appellate 
court must exercise its own judgment on whether the local plan is constitutionally 
forbidden.”125   Because the Court had not yet considered a constitutional challenge to a 
voluntary race-preference transfer policy for elementary and secondary schools, Judge 
Boudin looked to Grutter and Gratz to “provide some guidance for our narrow tailoring 
inquiry into the use of race to obtain the educational benefits of diversity”126 agreeing 
with the majority that the plan was narrowly tailored.127  
In 2004, parents128 of students enrolled in the Jefferson County Public Schools 
System (JCPS) in Jefferson County, Kentucky challenged the 2001 JCPS school 
assignment plan (Jefferson County BOE plan) as violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause.129  In essence, the plan allowed students to choose between residential based 
schools (“resides schools),130 traditional magnet schools,131 and non-traditional magnet 
                                                 
124 See id. at 16-18. 
125 Id. at 28. 
126 Id. at 17. 
127 Id. at 18. The Judge cited the plurality opinion of Paradise, where the requirements of narrow tailoring 
included requiring “…the proponent to show that a plan or practice is (i) necessary to the declared purpose, (ii) 
proportional to the declared purpose, and (iii) not more burdensome than necessary on third parties.” Id.at 16 
(citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
128 Plaintiff David McFarland filed on behalf on his two sons, Stephen and Daniel; both were denied entry to 
traditional schools.  McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 n. 3 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
Plaintiff Ronald Pittenger filed on behalf on his son Brandon, who was denied entry to a traditional school. Id. 
Plaintiff Anthony Underwood filed on behalf of his son Kenneth Maxwell Aubrey, who was denied entry to a 
traditional school. Id. Plaintiff Crystal Meredith filed on behalf of her son Joshua McDonald, who was unable 
to enroll in his resides school because it was filled to capacity; he was assigned to Young school, and applied 
for a transfer to Bloom school that was not in his assigned cluster. Id. He was denied admittance because it 
would have had an adverse effect on the racial composition of the original school he was attending. Id.  The 
Court held that the traditional school selection process was unconstitutional, id. at 838, but because the court 
held that none of the Plaintiffs who were denied entry to the traditional schools had proven they were injured 
by the race selection process, it was only Meredith, whose son was not affected by the traditional schools, who 
appealed. McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005). 
129 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 836. 
130 Geographic boundaries have significant impact on determining where most students will be assigned to 
school. Id. at 842. Except for Central, duPont Manual and YPAS, Male and Butler high schools, the Brown 
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schools.132  JCPS originally adopted the plan in 1973 in response to the Sixth Circuit 
mandate that they adopt a school board integration plan.133   The plan continued in many 
incarnations until June 2000 when the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky dissolved the desegregation decree.134  As part of the court’s ruling, 
JCPS was ordered to stop using racial quotas and to redesign admission to its magnet 
schools prior to commencement of the 2002-2003 school year.135  In response to the 
court’s order, the school board ended its use of racial quotas136 and after considering 
public feedback the board adopted the 2001 Plan.137
 Although the plan has many aspects, the part of the plan that is the subject of the 
Equal Protection challenge concerns selection for traditional schools, which admitted 
students by application.138   The district initially selected students for kindergarten spots 
                                                                                                                                                 
School, Brandeis Elementary, and the traditional programs at Foster and Maupin, each JCPS school has a 
“resides area”, and, based on the residence of their parent or guardian, each student is assigned to a “resides 
school”. Id. The non-magnet elementary schools are grouped into twelve clusters. Id. Each student has a 
designated “cluster resides schools” which includes the resides school for that students. Id.  The clusters were 
designed so that they would produce populations within the racial guidelines. Id. There are no clusters for the 
non-magnet middle and high schools and each has its own resides area. Id. at 843. The only selection criteria 
for any student’s admission to his or her resides school or a school within the cluster are age, completion of the 
previous grade, and residence. Id. 
131 There are nine traditional magnet schools. Id. These schools offer the regular curriculum in a particular 
environment and are not considered resides schools, even though students may only apply to most of the 
schools based on place of residence, because all students must apply to gain admission. Id. 
132 There are four non-traditional magnet schools. Id. They do not have a resides area, so any student is eligible 
to apply. Id. These schools offer specialized programs and curricula. Id. There are also eighteen magnet 
programs (small specialized programs within regular schools), as well as optional programs in twenty-two 
schools, (small programs with unique attributes). Id. Resides area is not taken into account for these two 
programs. Id. Additionally, there are magnet career academies at the high school level which offer programs 
concentrated in a technical career. Id.  Students must apply to the magnet program at these high schools.  
Thirteen are resides schools and one is not. Id. 
133 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d  925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973). 
134 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. Of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
135 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 841. 
136 The Board stopped using quotas at Central High School and at three magnet schools, including DuPont 
Manual High School (which included the Youth Performing Arts School), the Brown School, and Brandeis 
Elementary. Id. The Board concluded that the Court’s order did not include magnet traditional schools. Id. 
137 Id.  The stated missions of the 2001 plan is to provide “‘substantial uniform educational resources to all 
students’ and to teach basic skills and critical thinking ‘in a racially integrated environment.’” Id. at 840. 
138 Traditional schools offer the same comprehensive curriculum as other non-magnet schools but they 
emphasize “basic skills in a highly structured educational environment” and demand strong parent 
involvement. Id. at 846. The traditional program is offered at certain JCPS elementary, middle and high schools. 
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in the traditional program based on place of residence and random draw lists. The Board 
composed the random draw list of random applicants to the traditional school, who are 
randomly sorted into four lists at each grade level, Black Male, Black Female, White 
Male and White Female.139   The Office of Demographics reviews the principal’s 
selection to guarantee the school meets the racial guidelines and gives final approval.140   
At the outset, the district court made clear that the 2001 plan was subject to the 
strict scrutiny standard of review.141  The court recognized that context matters in 
deciding whether JCPS identified a compelling governmental interest.  And while the 
context of public elementary and secondary education differs from that of higher 
education, the court concluded that “the educational benefits of a diverse student body” 
remain the same.142  For this reason, the Court measured the program against the 
analytical framework annunciated in Grutter and Gratz.143   In evaluating the JCPS 
program, however, the Court observed that deference must be granted to local school 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. at 841.   Under the complicated plan, students have the potential to choose the school they will attend at the 
elementary, middle and high school level.  JCPS schools are divided into traditional schools, magnet schools, 
non-traditional magnet schools and option schools. At the elementary school and middle school level, students 
are assigned a choice of schools within their “resides area,” which is the geographic area in which the student’s 
parent(s) or guardian lives.  Each student may choose from one of several “resides schools” within his or her 
“resides area.”  Students have the choice of selecting a traditional or non-traditional magnet school.  Students 
who do not choose to select a school are assigned to the “resides school” in the student’s resides area. 
Administrators, in consultation with school principals jointly determine school assignments based on student 
choices, available space and racial guidelines. Id. at 842-43. 
139 Once students are selected for the traditional program in kindergarten, they are guaranteed a place in the 
traditional school program for each continuing year, should they choose to elect to remain in the program. Id. 
at 846. These students become the “pipeline” for the program. Id. The pipeline increases each year after 
kindergarten – through the first year of High School. Id. at 846-47. After the schools fill their slots from 
students in the pipeline, the principle has discretion to draw candidates from the different random draw lists to 
fill the additional available slots. Id. at 847. The principal makes his or her selection in a manner that assures the 
school will stay within the racial guidelines for the entire school population. Id. 
140 Id. at 847.  If students are not selected for a traditional school in one year, they may reapply to try to join the 
pipeline for the following year. Id. 
141 Id. at 848. The court wrote, however, that this case was distinguishable from Grutter and Gratz, but applied 
strict scrutiny none-the less. Id. at 848. 
142 Id. at 849 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). “The historical importance of the deference 
accorded to local school boards goes to the heart of our democratic form of government.  It is conceptually 
different, though more accepted than the defense discussed in Grutter and Bakke.” McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 
850.  
143 See, id. at 856, 858. 
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boards, which act in a democratic way to preserve the essence of primary school 
education, best executed at the local level.144  The Court ultimately concluded that the 
2001 Plan for assigning students to traditional schools failed. The plan was not narrowly 
tailored because “(1) the assignment process put Black and White applicants on separate 
assignment tracks and (2) the use of the separate lists appeared completely unnecessary to 
accomplish the Board’s goals.”145    
Ultimately, the court held that if JCPS struck down the portion of the plan that 
divided applicants to traditional schools by race, it could maintain the rest of the plan.  
Furthermore, the court found that none of the children whose parents challenged the 2001 
Plan were entitled to relief since “equity does not require the Plaintiff’s children be 
admitted to the school of their choice in the upcoming year, and like all other JCPS 
students, [plaintiff’s children] may reapply for admission to a traditional school for the 
[upcoming academic year.]”146 Plaintiff Meredith, on behalf of her daughter Crystal, 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which, per curium, held that the “well reasoned” district 
court opinion should stand.147  
In Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District No. 
1,148 PICS challenged a city program aimed at achieving diversity in its 10 public high 
                                                 
144 Id. at 851. 
145 Id. at 852, “The process is more like the program that was objectionable in affirmative action admission 
programs of Gratz and Bakke than like the use of race as a tipping factor, which the court found permissible in 
Grutter.” Id.  
146 Id. at 864. Plaintiff McFarland’s children were enrolled in a traditional school at the time of the ruling, 
making their request for injunctive relief moot. Id. Plaintiffs Pittenger and Underwood have not proved that 
their children were denied admission to a traditional school based solely on their race, nor did their children 
reapply to the traditional program. Id. at 864.. 
147 McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 513 (6th Cir. 2005). 
148 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d, 
285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 
26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 
1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g 
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 
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schools.  The City of Seattle School District (the District) maintains a voluntary open 
choice policy for its 10 high schools.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, high school 
assignment was based solely on the students’ residential neighborhood.  Assigning 
students based on neighborhood resulted in de facto segregation in the schools, yielding a 
disproportionate mix among African American, Asian American, Latino and Native 
American students.149   
In an effort to diversify its high schools, the District allocated the available spaces 
in its high schools by choice.150  A majority of students choose the same five schools and 
when a school is oversubscribed, the District chooses who shall attend that school based 
on a series of four tiebreakers.151  The first tiebreaker is the sibling tiebreaker and gives a 
ninth grader priority to enter a school if he or she has a sibling at that school.152  The 
second tiebreaker, and the one over which PICS brought suit, is considered the race-
preference tiebreaker.  The race-preference tiebreaker allows the District to select 
students whose race will mitigate the imbalance of the racial makeup of the selected 
school.153   
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
149  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166.  Approximately 70 percent of Seattle residents are white, 
and approximately 30 percent are nonwhite.  Id.  Seattle’s public school system students are approximately 40 
percent white and 60 percent nonwhite.  Id.  The majority of Seattle’s white public school students live north of 
downtown.  Id.  The majority of Seattle’s nonwhite public school students live south of downtown, including 
approximately 84 percent of all African American students, 74 percent of all Asian American students, 65 
percent of all Latino students, and 51 percent of all Native American students.  Id.  
150 Id. at 1168.  A majority of the city’s nonwhite students live south of downtown, and as a result, the schools 
located in those neighborhoods were disproportionately segregated.   See Id. at 1166.  The district responded to 
this because of an historic struggle with racial isolation among its individual neighborhoods.  Id.  Students list 
the high school they would like to attend in order of preference.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d. 
at 1226. Approximately 82 percent of students entering high school in 2000 selected one of five schools as their 
first choice.  Id. 
151 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1169.   
152 Id.  Fifteen to 20 percent of admissions to the ninth grade class are a result of the sibling tiebreaker.  Id.  
153 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d. at 1226. A school is out of balance if it deviates by more than 
15% from the overall racial breakdown of the population of students attending Seattle’s public schools (40% 
white/60% nonwhite). Id. If not for the tiebreaker preference, the school district would be de facto segregated 
due to residential patterns.  See id.  The district estimated that without the racial tiebreaker preference, the 
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PICS brought both a state law action and a federal law action in Federal District 
Court claiming that the racial tiebreaker preference violated the Washington Civil Rights 
Act, called Initiative 200, which provides that the state government, including school 
districts, may not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of … 
public education.154  PICS further claimed that the race-preference tiebreaker violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.155   
                                                                                                                                                 
nonwhite student populations of the 2000-2001 ninth grade class would have been 79.2 percent at Franklin, 
30.5 percent at Hale, 33 percent at Ballard, and 41.1 percent at Roosevelt.  Id.  Utilizing the racial tiebreaker 
preference, the nonwhite student populations for the 2000-2001 ninth grade class were 59.5 percent at 
Franklin, 40.6 percent at Hale, 54.2 percent at Ballard, and 55.3 percent at Roosevelt.  Id.  Approximately 3,000 
students entered Seattle high schools in the 2000-2001 school year, and approximately 300 were assigned to an 
oversubscribed high school as a result of the racial tiebreaker preference.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d 
at 1170.  In the third tiebreaker, distance of the student’s home to the school is measured, distance is calculated 
within 1/100 of a mile, and the closest students are admitted first.  Id. at 1170.  The distance tiebreaker 
accounts for approximately 70 to 75 percent of ninth grade admissions.  Id.  The fourth tiebreaker utilizes a 
lottery system to allocate the remaining seats.  Id.  The lottery tiebreaker is “virtually never used” since the 
distance tiebreaker assigns nearly all of the students.  Id.  
154 Id. at 1227.  In 1998, Washington voters passed Initiative 200, the Washington Civil Rights Act.  Id.  
Initiative 200 is codified at Washington Revised Code Annotated section 49.60.400.  Id. at 1226.  Section 
49.60.400 declares that “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or 
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006). 
155  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1226. 
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The District Court found in favor of the District on both claims.156  PICS appealed 
the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit 
invalidated the racial tiebreaker preference as violative of Initiative 200.157  Following a 
subsequent tour through state and federal courts,158  the Court of Appeals considered 
whether the District’s use of the race-preference tiebreaker in the open choice, non-
competitive high school assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.159
 Citing Johnson, Grutter and Adarand, Judge Fisher, writing for the Majority,160 
concluded that it would uphold the policy if the District could prove that there was a 
                                                 
156 As to the State claim, the court found “a duty to construe Initiative 200, if possible, in a way that makes the 
initiative consistent with state and federal constitutions.” Id. The authority to use race to provide a “general and 
uniform system of public schools,” interpreted by the courts to mean racially integrated schools, is an authority 
granted by the Washington Constitution. Id. at 1228. Application of Initiative 200 to the tiebreaker preference, 
therefore, would impermissibly effect an amendment to the state constitution. Id. at 1227. The state claim was a 
matter of first impression since Initiative 200 had not yet been construed by the Washington Supreme Court. 
Id.  The Court had to predict how the state’s highest court would apply Initiative 200.  Id. (citing Comm’r v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).  The Court evaluated the federal claim under the strict scrutiny test. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1232. The Court found as a matter of law a compelling governmental 
interest in “achieving racial diversity and mitigating the effects of de facto residential segregation…” Id. at 1235. 
The Court further held that the racial tiebreaker preference was narrowly tailored. See id. at 1239. The race-
preference tiebreaker only applies to schools deemed out of balance. Id. at 1238. When the entering class of the 
school is balanced, the District abandons the use of race assignments to that school and will not use race to 
assign the remaining spaces in the school. Id. Moreover, the plan is sound since it utilizes a 60/40 plan and 
allows a 15% deviation from those numbers. Id. The Court concluded that the racial tiebreaker passed strict 
scrutiny.  See id. at 1240. 
157 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002).  Law codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006). 
158 Following the Court’s decision to uphold the district plan, Parents Involved in Community Schools 
appealed.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 285 F.3d at 1243.  The Court granted an injunction, and the District was 
prohibited from using the racial tiebreaker in making high school assignments.  Id. at 1256.  Applying state law, 
the Court found the tiebreaker violated Washington law. Id. at 1253 (citing § 49.60.400).  Following reversal, 
withdrawal of opinion on grant of rehearing, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 294 
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), and certification of question to the Supreme Court of Washington, the Supreme 
Court of Washington issued an answer to the certified question. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Disc. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003). .The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to 
issue an injunction. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 989 (9th Cir. 
2004).  
159 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166. 
160 Chief Judge Schroeder and Judges Pregerson, Hawkins, W. Fletcher, and Rawlinson joined the majority 
opinion.  Id. at 1166.  Judge Kozinski concurred in the result; however, Judge Kozinski opined that the issue 
before the Court was “fundamentally different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously 
addressed.” Id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring). See infra note 50  Judge Bea, joined by Judges Kleinfeld, 
Tallman, and Callahan, dissented. Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).     
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compelling governmental interest in adopting the policy and that the policy was narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest.161  The Majority noted early in the decision that “context 
matters”162 and therefore, defined both the compelling governmental interest test and the 
narrowly tailored test in a manner consistent with the education-based test outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz.163  However, the Court also required the District to 
prove that the policy seeks to avoid the harms that result from racially concentrated 
schools.164  The Court, however employed the five-prong “education based” narrowly 
tailored test as outlined in Grutter and Gratz.165    
      In evaluating the compelling governmental interest, the Court recognized the 
affirmative educational and societal benefits that flow from racial diversity.166 Judge 
Fisher wrote that these interests are similar to the interests set forth in Grutter, yet the 
contextual differences are significant.  Grutter noted the importance in higher education 
to prepare students for “work and citizenship,”167 and Judge Fisher opined that “public 
secondary schools have an equal if not more important role in this preparation.”168 
Nevertheless, the Court still found a compelling governmental interest in the District’s 
                                                 
161 Id. at 1166. 
162 Id. at 1173 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
preference governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”)).  
163 Id. at 1180.   
164 Id. at 1174. 
165 Id. at 1174.  The Court would only uphold the policy if the racial tiebreaker met the following conditions: (1) 
an individualized consideration of applicants, (2) the absence of quotas, (3) serious, good faith consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action program, (4) no member of any racial group was unduly 
harmed, and (5) the program had a sunset provision or some other end point. Id. 
166 Id. at 1175.  At trial, expert testimony established the following benefits: “improved critical thinking skills,” 
“socialization and citizenship advantages of racially diverse schools,” and opportunities to network in areas of 
higher education and employment. Id.  
167 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)). 
168 Id. 
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goals.169  The Court further found that the Program’s use of a raced based tie-breaker was 
narrowly tailored and therefore was constitutionally permissible.170  
 Judge Kozinski wrote a concurring opinion that challenged the wisdom of 
applying the Supreme Court’s Grutter/Gratz strict scrutiny test to a case concerning a 
race-preference policy aimed at achieving diversity in secondary school.171   He 
analogized the Majority’s application of the Grutter/Gratz strict scrutiny test to pounding 
square pegs into round holes.172  In Judge Kozinski’s opinion, context clearly matters, 
and there are meaningful differences when the government seeks racial classifications to 
oppress blacks or other minorities173 as opposed to teaching children how to deal 
                                                 
169 Id.  The Court also found a compelling government interest in avoiding the harms that result from racially 
concentrated schools.  Id. at 1180.  In furtherance of that interest, the District is entitled to pursue the benefits 
of racial diversity and avoid the harms of segregation in the absence of a court order deeming it in violation of 
the Constitution.  Id. at 1179.  This entitlement is derived from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
where the court referenced the voluntary integration of schools as “sound educational policy within the 
discretion of local school officials.”  Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971)).  
170 The Court first considered the individualized evaluation of each applicant. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 
F.3d at 1180. The Court found that this prong of the test was not totally relevant in the current context since 
there was no competition issue, unlike Grutter and Gratz. See id. More importantly, since race itself is the 
relevant consideration when curing de facto segregation, the tiebreaker preference “must necessarily focus on 
the race of its students.” Id. at 1183 (citing Comfort v. Lynn Sch.Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005). For 
these reasons, the district need not conduct an individualized consideration of each student since the plan is 
otherwise narrowly tailored.  See Parents Involved in Cmty.Schs., 426 F.3d at 1183. 
 The Court then turned to the absence of quotas and found that the 15% plus/minus variance is not a 
quota because it does not reserve a fixed number of spots for students based on race. Id. at 1184. The District 
seeks to enroll a critical mass of white/nonwhite students in its oversubscribed schools to reach its compelling 
interests. Id. The 15% plus/minus variance is a goal rather than a rigid ratio. See id. at 1186. The Court found 
that the tiebreaker policy was necessary and the most race neutral alternative since the tiebreaker preference 
allows the realization of the compelling interests and discourages a return to enrollment patterns based on 
racially segregated housing patterns. See id. at 1187. Here, as in Grutter, the Court deferred to the District’s 
judgment in evaluating race neutral alternatives. See id. at 1188.  
 Concerning the fourth prong, the Court found that the policy did not create undue harm because “(1) 
the District is entitled to assign all students to any of its schools, (2) no student is entitled to attend any specific 
school and (3) the tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit any race or group of individuals to the detriment of 
another…” Id. at 1192. Finally, the Court had no issue with the sunset provision that Justice O’Connor, writing 
in Grutter, found essential to the viability of any race-preference policy. See id. In this instance, the District 
reviews the plan annually and is responsive to choice patterns and constituents’ concerns. Id. The Court shares 
O’Connor’s hope in Grutter that in 25 years, racial preferences will no longer be necessary. Id. 
171 See id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring).  
172 Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
173 Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).  
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respectfully and collegially with their peers during their formative years.174   Further, he 
wrote, the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny tests have been more reactive than proactive, 
changing definitional course in response to the context of each issue presented.175  For 
these reason, the plan should be evaluated under a rational basis standard of review.  
Specifically, he would employ a “robust and realistic rational basis review…where courts 
consider the actual reasons for the plan in light of the real-world circumstances giving 
rise to it.”176
 Justice Kozinski concluded that the Seattle Plan is far from the original evils at 
which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed.177  Rather, it gives “the American 
Melting Pot a healthy stir” without benefiting any group.178  For this reason, Judge 
Kozinski would leave the decision to those in charge, namely local officials, and 
therefore, affirm the decision of the district court.   
 Judge Bea, joined by three other judges, wrote a strong dissent.179 Judge Bea 
rejected the Grutter court’s definition of a compelling governmental interest, writing that 
                                                 
174 Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
175 See id. at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Comparing this case to past Supreme Court decisions, Judge 
Kozinski noted that “the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable 
in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring)  “[The] plan at issue . . . is 
fundamentally different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously addressed.  It is not, like 
old-fashioned racial discrimination laws, aimed at oppressing blacks…”. Id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(quoting Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)).  Unlike 
modern affirmative action, the plan does not “give one racial group an edge over another.” Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27 (Boudin, C.J., 
concurring)).  “The plan does not segregate persons by race.”  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 
1193.(Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27 (Boudin, C.J., concurring)).  The plan does 
not involve racial quotas.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27 
(Boudin, C.J., concurring)). “These are meaningful differences.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193. 
176 Id. at 1194 (citation omitted); see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) 
(holding that the “[S]tate may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to 
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational” (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S. Dept. of Agric. 
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973)).  
177 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). 
178 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1196. 
179 See id. at 1196-1222 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
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the case is not about the right to be educated in a racially diverse academic setting.180  
Rather, according to Judge Bea, the case issue was whether the government can impose 
on students the decision to be educated in a diverse setting.181  According to Judge Bea, 
the District’s plan was nothing more than racial balancing, based on quotas and, must, 
therefore be struck down.182
 Judge Bea essentially accused the majority of gerrymandering the strict scrutiny 
test to fit its desired goal.183   The Majority’s reliance on Grutter was inappropriate since 
in that case, the court recognized that there were a host of factors, race being one of them, 
to which a candidate for admission in the law school can bring to a classroom.184  In 
contrast, the Seattle plan merely focused on race, and focused on such in a large context, 
not just for an individual.185   Ultimately, Judge Bea agreed with Judge Kozinski that 
context matters and wrote that the Grutter case was limited in its precedential weight to 
                                                 
180 Id. 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).   
 At the outset, it is important to note what this case is not about.  The idea that children  
 will gain social, civic, and perhaps educational skills by attending schools with a proportion  
 of students of other ethnicities and races, which proportion reflects the world in which they  
 will move, is a notion grounded in common sense.  It may be generally, if not universally,  
 accepted.  But that is not the issue here.   
Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
181 Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 1202 (Bea, J., dissenting).  Judge Bea opined that the Grutter diversity interest pursued “genuine 
diversity” in the student body, where race was considered as a single plus factor among many factors.  Id. (Bea, 
J., dissenting). Here, the District pursues a diversity interest which considers solely racial diversity, specifically a 
predefined grouping of races in the schools.  Id. (Bea, J., dissenting).  The District’s interest is not a valid 
compelling interest and violates equal protection.  Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 1198 (Bea, J., dissenting).  Judge Bea held that the majority and concurring opinions tried to distinguish 
past Supreme Court cases by focusing on the effects of discrimination rather than the fact of discrimination.  
Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). This allowed the majority and concurring opinions to create two categories 
distinguishing the Seattle plan: “(1) the effects of other race discrimination plans were much worse than Seattle’s 
and (2) the effects were visited on certain races.”  Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea concluded, however, that 
these differences are irrelevant because “there is no de minimis exception to the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. 
(Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712 (9th Cir. 1997)).  
Additionally, equal protection protects the rights of individuals, not the rights of certain races or groups. Id. 
(Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea further wrote that not calling the Seattle’s plan a quota does not make it 
something other than a quota – the quota is the percentage by which the particular school’s racial imbalance 
differs from the District’s target.  Id.  “A rose by any other name…etc.”  Id.        
184 Id. at 1202. 
185 Id. 
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decisions concerning challenges to affirmative action admission programs in higher 
education.186    
III. Creating a New Compelling Governmental Interest in Order to Uphold 
Race Preference Programs in Grades K-12 
 
            Race-preference programs at the K-12 level are essential to ensuring fairness and 
equality in education as well as the spirit and the goals of the civil rights movements.187  
Legally, however, their constitutional durability is questionable.  As a general rule, race 
preference policies only survive if the defending party can show the policy is necessary to 
remedy present effects of past discrimination or if it has adopted a mission statement or 
other policy statement that explains that the purpose of the program is to achieve 
“viewpoint diversity.”188 Today, few school districts suffer from the effects of past 
discrimination.189  Further, many believe that the educational benefits that graduate 
students derive from viewpoint diversity are not equally valuable to children in grades K-
12.  Thus, neither of the Court’s two demonstrated compelling governmental interests in 
supporting race-preference programs exist in either the Meredith or the PICS case.  For 
this reason, the Court must find a third compelling governmental interest that would 
                                                 
186 Id. at 1207.  “The ‘academic freedom’ of a university allows it ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’”  Id. (quoting 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).  High schools do not have these 
freedoms. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207. High schools are not permitted to decide who may 
teach based upon racial grounds. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)).  High 
schools may not decide who “may be admitted to study.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207. When 
the government provides public education in secondary schools, it “must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”  Id. (quoting Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).  Additionally, there are no U.S. Supreme Court 
cases providing high schools with the same “academic freedoms” afforded to universities by the First 
Amendment. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207 (quoting United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 
728-29 (1992) (observing that “a state university system is quite different in very relevant respects from primary 
and secondary schools”)). 
187 See infra notes ___ 
188 See supra notes ___ 
189 But see infra at note 234. 
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survive strict scrutiny in order to ensure that the Jefferson County BOE program or 
Seattle Plan remain constitutionally permissible.   
While carving out a new compelling governmental interest is not out of the realm 
of judicial precedent it is problematic for other reasons.190  First, it suggests that the court 
will expand its definition of permissible compelling governmental interests in the interest 
of ensuring that programs created in response to a particular problem remain viable.  
Second, it will send a message to the lower courts that result oriented jurisprudence is 
preferable in the area of affirmative action law, thereby granting lower courts permission 
to fashion their own definition of what supports a compelling governmental interest.191
Deciding the Meredith and PICS cases comes during a highly charged period for 
proponents of affirmative action.  Currently, no less than four states have banned race 
preference in education, including the two states with the highest profile race-preference 
challenges.192  In 1996, California adopted Proposition 209 (“Prop 209”), which banned 
discrimination and preferential treatment in the State’s government and education 
institutions.193   Proponents of race-preference education programs, however, cite 
                                                 
190 See, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)(O’Connor, J)(writing that the context of a particular 
program should dictate the definition of the strict scrutiny test.) 
191 See supra note 126.  “where the outcome in the Supreme Court is uncertain and past pronouncements were 
made in contexts different that the context now presented, the appellate court must excercise its own 
judgment.” 418 F.3d at 17 (Boudin, J. concurring) 
192  In 2006 Michigan voters  passed Proposition 2 banning affirmative action in higher education.  California 
voters passed Proposition 209 in 1996 limiting affirmative action policies in all government agencies, including 
higher education.  Florida also passed a law called “One Florida” limiting anti-affirmative action policies in all 
state universities.  See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6.001, .002 (2007).  Washington  State passed Initiative 
200 banning affirmative action in 1998.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 49.60.400 (LexisNexis 2007).  See 
generally Stuart Silverstein, Connerly still targets racial preferences; The ex-UC regent, at USC to speak at a forum, says he 
plans to put bans on affirmative action on ballots in as many as five more states next year, LA Times, Jan. 17, 2007, B2.   
193 Proposition 209 (1996), CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a); see also Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 
F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that proposition 209 was constitutional in that it did not violation the equal 
protection clause). 
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Proposition 209 as evidence of the need for race-preference programs.194   Failure to use 
race-preference admissions policies, they argue, results in reduced minority enrollment at 
elite educational instructions.195  Their opponents cite several recent studies and various 
graduate school responses to anti-affirmative action, claiming that despite recent choke-
holds on attempts to diversify, schools are creating new, legally sound ways to “socially 
engineer racial proportionality.”196
 Regardless of which side of the race-preference debate one takes, it is clear that  
whether it is Justices of the Supreme Court,197  Presidents of elite academic 
institutions,198 or social commentators,199 there exists a clear belief that the absence of 
                                                 
194 See Heather MacDonald, Elites to Anti-Affirmative Action Voters: Drop Dead, 17 CITY JOURNAL 15, 15-28 
(Winter 2007), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_1_prop209.html (claiming that elite California 
schools are engineering ways to get around affirmative action bans). 
195 See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “Systematic Analysis of 
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1 (2005) (criticizing Sander’s 
article/study as statistically narrow and offering opposing reasons for low minority success rates in law school); 
Jeffery Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, NY TIMES, June 1, 2003, Magazine Ed., p. 54; Marisa Schultz, Prop 
2's effects; Minority admissions drop slightly at U-MOfficials: It's too early to blame ban for dip, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 17, 
2007, 3A (finding that minority enrollment has dropped at U. Mich. after prop. 2 passing); Eleanor Yang Su, 
UC's diversity threatened, educator says; Atkinson promotes affirmative action, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 
2007, B3 (former U. of Cal. President warned in a speech that if more states pass anti-affirmative action laws 
minority enrollment would plument, citing effects of prop. 209 in California); but see Heather MacDonald, Elites 
to Anti-Affirmative Action Voters: Drop Dead, 17 CITY JOURNAL 15, 15-28 (Winter 2007), available at 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_1_prop209.html (claiming that elite California schools are engineering 
ways to get around affirmative action bans). 
196 See Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STANFORD LAW 
REVIEW 367 (2004) (claiming that affirmative action programs in higher education may actually harm minority 
success rates, rather than help because the programs admit unqualified students); MacDonald, supra note 194, at 
15; see also Shikha Dalmia, Blacks and Hispanics Don’t Need Racial Preference Laws: As California shows, minorities get 
into good schools all the same, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, B2; Rich Lowry, They Want to Discriminate, 
NATIONAL REV. ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2006; see generally Ellis Cose, The Color of Change; Why are we still debating whether 
race should be a factor in college admissions?, NEWSWEEK November 13, 2006, p.52. 
197 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct. 
2351 (June 5, 2006) (comments of Justice Ginsburg (“What’s constitutionally required one day gets 
constitutionally prohibited the next day.  That’s very odd.”)); id. at 12 (comments of Justice Souter (“How 
could the Constitution the day that the decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make efforts any 
more, it can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black schools and white 
schools”)). 
198 Responding to the Michigan vote to ban racial preference, Mary Sue Coleman, President of U. of Michigan 
said, “I am standing here today to tell you that I will not allow this University to go down the Path of 
Medioctiry.”  MacDonald, supra note 195, at 29.   
199 See, e.g., Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note __; Charles R. Calleros, Law, Policy, and Strategies for 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 51 (2006) (providing a guide for university admissions 
policy and strategy); Leslie Garfield, The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision Upholding 
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race-preference programs in academia—at any level—will result in a return to the 
disproportionately white classrooms of the Fifties and Sixties.  Data confirms this 
concern. A recent study at the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found that as 
“desegregation plans have been dismantled across the South, the proportion of black 
students in majority white schools has decreased by 13 percentage points.”200    Several 
other studies confirm an increase in residential isolation among racial groups.201
   The concerns that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer raised that abandoning the race-
preference programs that the Jefferson County School Board created in response to a 
court ordered desegregation plan, might result in a return to segregated schools seem a 
real possibility.202  To the extent that other Justices agree with them,203 there is little 
room under the current law to uphold the race-preference school assignment plans in the 
Meredith and PICS cases. Under the current law, since the Jefferson County BOE 
program has its genesis in  a court ordered mandate, it can only be upheld if the court 
finds that present effects of past discrimination remain in Jefferson County.204  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Affirmative Action Admission Programs is Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15 (2006); Rosen, supra note 195; 
For an interesting discussion on the compatibility and efficacy of the non-legal social movement and legal 
movement supporting affirmative action, in the context of the Grutter case, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, 
Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005) (reasoning that the 
affirmative action movement only achieved minimal gains through legal means, as evidenced by the Grutter 
decision).   
200 Frankenberg, Erica, et. al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools Are We Losing the Dream?, Civil Rights 
Project at Harvard University (January 2003); see also, Kozol, Jonathan, Still Separate, Still Unequal: America's 
Educational Apartheid, 311 Harper’s Magazine 1864 (Sep. 2005). 
201 See,  Traub, James,  Return to Segregation New York Times Magazine (Dec. 21 2001) reprinted at Race 
Matters, http://www.racematters.org/returntosegregation.htm.  (2000 census report confirms that Hispanics 
and Asians are living in more heavily Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods than they were 10 years ago, while 
whites and blacks are only slightly more exposed to one another than they were in 1990); Separate but Unequal: A 
New Study Documents a Return to Segregation, 118 Amer. School Bd. J. 10 (2001) 
202 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 12, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct. 
2351 (June 5, 2006); see also supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing comments at oral argument). 
203 To be fair, at least three justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) on the court have voted against affirmative 
action policies, finding no compelling governmental interest in “viewpoint diversity.”  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
204 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d 1162, 1197 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467 (1992)).   
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recent testimony makes clear that such is not the case.205  Alternatively, given the Court’s 
contextual approach to race-preference programs, the Court could clearly find that the 
interest in “viewpoint diversity” supports a compelling governmental interest in the 
Jefferson County BOE program or in the Seattle Plan, however, there are compelling 
arguments against merging race-preference policies at the K-12 level with those created 
for graduate school admissions.206   
To be sure, the Court has various options and legal theories at its disposal for 
reaching conclusions it finds socially correct.  Where a program violates an individual’s 
rights as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause, the Court may always find a socially 
correct interest that overrides the Equal Protection violation.207   The Court, therefore, 
has the power to identify new evidence which, if presented, would justify a permissible 
infringement.208  Ideally, however, creating a new compelling governmental interest 
would be a last resort and the Court should first consider whether it could uphold a 
challenged race-preference plan under existing identified compelling governmental 
interests. 
A. Evaluating Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans in the context of 
the Court’s Already Defined Compelling Governmental Interests. 
 
Where the party defending a race-preference plan, created in response to a court 
ordered desegregation program, can no longer produce evidence of present effects of past 
                                                 
205 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct. 
2351 (June 5, 2006) (comments of Mr. Mellen (“We do not contend . . . that the purpose of the plan is to 
remediate past discrimination against black students.”)). 
206 See infra at notes 227-232. 
207 See supra at notes 44-95. 
208 The Court has significant precedent behind it to support any legal reasoning based on shifting societal 
views.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding Texas anti-abortion laws unconstitutional); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) on segregation); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick) 
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discrimination, the Court must strike the plan down.209  Present effects of past 
discrimination, sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest, have been 
established by judicial findings, as evidenced by court ordered consent decrees,210 
Congressional, State or city council findings211 or any other substantiated statistics or 
other evidentiary indicia.212  The proof, however, must be specific and narrowly tailored 
to the remedial program it seeks to remedy.213  Thus, when the City of Richmond 
provided only a generalized assertion that there had been past discrimination in the entire 
construction industry, the court found it was to broad to support a compelling 
governmental interest in requiring prime contractors awarded city construction contracts 
to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more 
“Minority Business Enterprises.”214  In Paradise, the Court held that a court order was 
justified by a finding of a compelling governmental interest in a race-preference 
promotion plan.215  
                                                 
209 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1197 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 
(1992)). 
210 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 164 (1987) (consent decrees).  
211 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 484 (1989) (the majority at the Circuit Court 
level “found that national findings of discrimination in the construction industry, when considered in 
conjunction with the statistical study concerning the awarding of prime contracts in Richmond, rendered the 
city council’s conclusion that low minority participation in city contracts was due to past discrimination 
‘reasonable.’”).  But see id. at 504 (“While the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they 
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must 
identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use race conscious relief. 
Congress has made national findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of fields. If all a state 
or local government need do is find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set-aside program, the 
constraints of the Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, have been rendered a nullity.”). 
212 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 172-74. 
213 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (“The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal 
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.”); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183-84.   
214 J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 510-11. 
215 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 185-86.  The Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, held that the 50 percent promotion 
requirement was permissible under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was 
justified by compelling governmental interest in eradicating discriminatory exclusion of blacks from positions 
and was narrowly tailored to serve its purposes.  Id. 
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 Jefferson County originally adopted its court ordered desegregation plan in 
response to a Sixth Circuit directive, called the Haycraft desegregation decree.216  In June 
1999, the same court found that the Haycraft plan was still legally in effect.217  The 
following year, however, the court dissolved the desegregation decree and ordered JCPS 
to “cease using racial quotas”218 and to redesign and reevaluate admissions procedures at 
the grammar schools.219  The current plan, which is under Court review, is a voluntary 
extension of the court’s desegregation plan.220  The Seattle plan, which is the subject of 
the PICS challenge, was adopted in response to an identified imbalance in school 
registration and the racial tension that resulted there from.221  In fact, the Seattle Plan, 
was the first comprehensive desegregation plan adopted voluntarily and without a court 
order.222
 In both the Meredith and the PICS cases, the proponent of the race preference 
program could not present evidence of present effects of past discrimination.  Indeed, the 
Sixth Circuit has already concluded that there is no longer a need to legally mandate 
desegregation, or any program that would promote integration in public schools.223  And 
despite Seattle’s long running voluntary desegregation program, the City never has, nor 
would it be likely to provide credible evidence of present effects of past 
                                                 
216 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(Gordon, J.).  
217 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 774 (W.D. Ky. 1999) [hereinafter Hampton 
I].
218 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000) [hereinafter 
Hampton II]. 
219 Id.  
220 McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
221 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1167-1169 (9th Cir. 2005). 
222 Id. at 1168 
223 See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 851-52 (quoting Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 
1966) (discussing the active role of democratically elected school boards in promoting diversity and the court’s 
deference toward their decisions)  
 41
discrimination.224  Consequently, a reviewing Court would not be able to find a 
compelling governmental interest based on an historic need to right past vestiges of 
segregation.225  However, as Judge Heyburn recognized in Meredith, as many school 
systems escape the mandate of desegregation decrees, they face a choice of direction.226   
As an analysis of Meredith and PICS illustrate the constraint of the Equal Protection 
Laws seem to confine such a direction in light of its treatment of race-preference policies 
adopted in response to desegregation decrees. The Court’s application of the compelling 
governmental interest prong as it relates to education based race-preference policies, 
however, seems to offer another means by which programs with their roots in 
desegregation plans can be upheld.  
 Even if the Court cannot find present effects of past discrimination, it can find a 
compelling governmental interest on another identifiable ground.  The Court has held that 
there is a compelling governmental interest in attaining “viewpoint diversity.”227   Justice 
Powell, writing for a fractionalized majority in Bakke, was the first to recognize that there 
was a compelling governmental interest in hearing different voices in the classroom.228  
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Court echoed Justice Powell’s conclusion.229  In Grutter, 
                                                 
224 The dissent pointed out that both parties concede that the plan does not attempt to remedy past effects 
discrimination in the school district or community.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1197.  At the 
District Court level, it was established that the Seattle Choice Plan was created for the sole purpose of 
“mitigate[ing] the historical effects on its high schools of the residential segregation of Seattle's neighborhoods, 
and to allow all students the opportunity to benefit from the pedagogical and socio-cultural values a racially 
diverse school offers.”  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  The 
District Court concluded that convincing evidence was presented that segregated housing patterns existed in 
the Seattle School District which caused the school systems to be racially concentrated.  Id. at 1235.     
225 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06.  The Supreme Court subsequently has agreed with that position.  See Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 274-76 (plurality opinion). 
226 See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51.  “It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal protection, 
local control and limited deference are now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, virtually 
prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies once required by law.”  Id. at 851.
227 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Ca. at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 311-12 (1978).   
228 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
229 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003). 
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Justice O’Connor wrote, “today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify using race in university 
admissions.”230  For this reason, the Court in Grutter, found that the Law School’s 
mission statement, which stated that admitting a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority students was essential to its educational mission.231  Evidence of a mission 
statement that highlights a program’s goal of attaining diversity for its educational 
benefits is sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest.232   
The value of “viewpoint diversity” at the college and post-graduate level is two 
fold.  First, the Court has held that to the extent that undergraduate and graduate schools 
are engaged in training future leaders, there is a significant value in those leaders 
understanding contrary viewpoints.233  These viewpoints may bring “outlooks and ideas 
that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with 
understanding their vital service to humanity.”234  Creating diversity in the classroom is 
equally important to civil tolerance.235  Second, the Court stated that “diversity promotes 
learning outcomes and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse work force, for 
society, and for the legal profession.”236  Ultimately, however, the Court held that the 
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stated mission of the law school to admit a “critical mass” of diverse voices in the 
classroom so that various points of view could be heard and understood, was sufficient to 
support its finding that achieving student diversity in the context of public higher 
education is a compelling governmental interest.237   
The Grutter Court placed significant emphasis on the law school’s stated mission.  
Indeed, the Court held that the Law School could only achieve its mission by admitting a 
critical mass of diverse students.238  Under this analysis, if the Meredith or PICS 
defendants are able to show that their mission in adopting the voluntary race-preference 
plans is to create a diverse student body so that students can benefit from various voices, 
the Court might find that student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest in 
the context of education at the K-12 level.  However, neither the JCPS nor the City of 
Seattle are likely to be able to provide such evidence.239  Each program was created to 
erase segregation from their school districts.240  The Supreme Court’s edict in Brown v. 
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Board of Education that racial discrimination in education is wrong,241 was likely the 
more sufficient reason to compel the voluntary integration plans that produced diversity 
in the classroom.   
Thus, unlike the Law School’s mission of creating a diverse student body so that 
future lawyers can appreciate various viewpoints, the Seattle Plan and the Jefferson 
County BOE plan are designed to provide learning opportunities at the “best schools in 
the district” for students who might otherwise have the opportunity to attend such schools 
if the school districts were drawn along neighborhood lines.242  Therefore, because the 
missions of the Jefferson County BOE and Seattle Plan do not state a goal of enhancing 
the learning experience of all in the classroom, the notion of “viewpoint diversity” is 
likely not to support a compelling governmental interest.  In fact “the educational benefits 
[do not] remain the same”243
The majority opinions in both McFarland244 and PICS wrestled with the notion of 
relying on the findings of Grutter that the educational benefit of diversity in higher 
education extends to students in grades K-12 but ultimately came out in favor of finding 
viewpoint diversity was a sufficient compelling governmental interest in the context of 
grade K-12 education, thereby extending Justice Powell’s definition beyond the limits of 
public higher education.245  Judge Fisher in PICS was comfortable finding that “the 
affirmative educational benefits that flow from racial diversity”246 sufficiently exist in 
grade school, and thus the court was comfortable in finding a compelling governmental 
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interest.  The McFarland court similarly found that the educational benefits identified in 
Grutter were sufficiently present to support a compelling governmental interest in the 
instance case.247  But the court decisions seem to gloss over the seemingly important 
differences between educational benefits at primary and secondary school level and the 
benefits in post-secondary schools.   
Several appellate court judges disagreed with the appropriate application of 
Justice Powell’s findings in Bakke to K-12 program.  In concurring and dissenting 
opinions respectively, Judges Boudin, Kozinski and Bea suggested that while viewpoint 
diversity was a sufficient compelling governmental interest, there was no demonstrable 
evidence of the need for viewpoint diversity in the cases before them.248  Judge Boudin 
wrote that the context of a plan adopted to promote safety and student attendance was so 
distinct from anything the Court had previously considered, that it was wrong of the 
Comfort majority to apply the Court’s previously stated compelling governmental 
interests in the case before him.249  In his PICS concurrence, Judge Kozinski was critical 
of the majority for failing to recognize the differing contexts of education in a child’s 
formative years as opposed to the graduate school level.  To Judge Kozinski, applying 
Grutter to the case before him was tantamount to “pounding square pegs into a round 
hole.”250  Judge Bea, joined by three other judges, wrote that it was wholly inappropriate 
to consider the Seattle Plan in the same context as public higher education programs.251
Indeed, Justice Boudin correctly points out that to date, the Court has only stated 
that there is a compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity in the context of 
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public higher education.252     Should the Supreme Court following the reasoning of the 
appellate court judges who reject the application of viewpoint diversity to grades K-12, it 
must find a different constitutionally acceptable compelling governmental interest in the 
use of race-preference student assignment plans or it must abolish the program.253
B. Constructing a New Compelling Governmental Interest  
Some members of the Supreme Court are clearly concerned with abolishing 
programs that have attained their goals.254  As Justice Beyer said in the Meredith case 
oral arguments, it would be difficult to tell a school district “it cannot make efforts any 
more, it can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black 
schools and white schools?”255   For this reason the Court could define a third compelling 
governmental interest which would be the need to preserve programs whose abolishment 
threatens a return to the de facto segregation the program originally sought to cure. 
 The Court, however, has never stated a compelling governmental interest in 
assuring that programs created in response to de facto segregation remain constitutional 
once they attain their goal of integration.256  The Court has, however, appeared to reach a 
conclusion to assure that the societal goals of abolishing racism or discrimination were 
met.  In Katzenbach v. McClung,257 the Court found that a local, family-owned barbeque 
restaurant that refused to serve Black patrons was in violation of the 1964 Civil Right 
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Act.258  The Court considered the Constitutionality of Title II of the Act, which Congress 
enacted through its powers under the Commerce Clause, and “which requires hotels and 
motels to serve transients without regard to their race or color.”259  Ollie’s Barbeque, 
which did not generally serve out of state patrons, purchased 46% of its meat from a local 
supplier who procured the meat from outside the State.  The Court found the Act was 
constitutional as applied to anyone who served food or used merchandise that traveled 
through interestate commerce.260  Based on this reasoning, the Court found that despite 
the failure of the government to show evidence of a direct impact on interstate commerce, 
the owners of Ollie’s Barbeque violated the Act.261  In McClung, the Court displayed its 
willingness to hold one small restaurant, which was “trivial by itself” accountable for the 
greater good of ensuring the abolishment of segregated establishments.262 The McClung 
ruling illustrates Court’s paramount interest in attaining the societal goals of reversing 
discrimination. 263  
Where race-preference student assignment plans are concerned, the Court is faced 
with a similar challenge of constructing a means to uphold these programs, in light of the 
fact that they are not supported by previously identified compelling governmental 
interests.  The most recent race-preference cases, Johnson, Grutter and Gratz, and the 
Court’s history or responding to societal needs, support the idea that the Court may 
stretch its Constitutional boundaries to define a new compelling governmental interest 
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when the context of a particular program is distinguishable from those the Court has 
previously considered.264   
The Seattle School Board adopted the Seattle Plan because assigning students to 
schools based on neighborhoods resulted in de facto segregation.  The same was true of 
the Lynn School Board which was challenged in the Comfort decision and with the 
Jefferson County Board of Education.265    In each instance, the School Board was driven 
by the need to achieve the constitutional guarantees of Brown v. Board of Education, 266 
which held that schools that learning in a segregated school environmental is “inherently 
unequal.” 267  Abolishment of these programs would, arguably, result in a return to 
neighborhood assignment plans, which would, in turn, yield in de facto segregation 
again.268   Given these circumstances, the Court would best serve the needs of school 
districts to retain hard-earned gains of equal education at the K-12 level by finding a 
compelling governmental interest in assuring that programs created in response to de 
facto segregation remain constitutional once they attain their goal of integration.269   A 
party defending a race-preference student assignment plan could support this compelling 
governmental interest by presenting evidence that abolishment of the program would 
result in a return to unequal school for different racial groups.   
There is ample evidence available to support the assertion that abolishment of 
race-preference student assignment plans could result in a return to de fact segregation.  
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Neighborhood school assignment plans remain the most race-neutral means of assigning 
students to particular schools at the K-12 level.270  It is also the means by which most 
schools assign students.  The flaw in neighborhood assignment plans, however, is that to 
date, many neighborhoods remain racially segregated. 271  Thus assignment by 
neighborhood would result in segregated schooling. 
The Court has long recognized that American’s live in segregated areas and that 
housing patterns require congressional and judicial intervention in order to assure racial 
equity.  Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to “prevent discrimination in the 
exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster our transformation to a society that is no 
longer fixated on race.”272 One purpose of the act was to “adopt devices that [States] used 
to thwart the will of congress to secure franchise for blacks”273 such as racial 
“gerrymandering,” which is "[t]he practice of dividing a geographic area into electoral 
districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by 
diluting the opposition's voting strength."274 State legislatures would draw boundaries by 
neighborhood, extending lines so that particular groups would be included together.  
Implicit in this guard against racial gerrymandering is that racial groups tend to live in 
neighborhoods that are segregated from other racial groups.  Since evidence supports that 
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current segregated housing patterns remain the norm, school assignment plans based on 
living patterns could yield de facto segregation.  
The School Boards in the Meredith and PICS cases could most likely meet this 
burden of showing that their race-preference student assignment plans were adopted in 
response to concerns of potential de facto segregation and that abolishment of their 
programs could result in a return to the very evil the plans sought to cure.  In Meredith,  
JCPS put forth evidence that the Jefferson County BOE plan was developed as a means 
to retain the gains JCPS made through its court ordered desegregation plan.  After the 
district court ruled that racial quotas were no longer necessary to achieve equal education, 
JCPS held public hearings and devised a means to ensure its desegregation efforts would 
not be thwarted.275  Defendant’s in the PICS case presented evidence that the Seattle Plan 
was created because high school assignment based soles on a student’s residential 
neighborhood resulted in de facto segregation.276    
A third compelling governmental interest in ensuring that gains made from a race-
preference plan will not be undone is appropriate in light of the need to maintain the 
equality strides made over the past four decades.  This interest is better suited for 
consideration of student assignment plans at the K-12 level than is the applicability of 
“viewpoint diversity.”  At the outset, the race-preference student assignment plans were 
not created to ensure students hear from different voices in the classroom.  They were 
created to guarantee that all students receive the same quality education.277 The need for 
diversity in the elementary classroom is mandated by the understanding that there is a 
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link between segregated schools and academic achievement.278  The driving notion of 
access to equal education is wholly different from hearing diverse viewpoints.  For this 
reason, it is appropriate to consider the compelling governmental interest in programs 
aimed at grades K-12 in a different context from programs for institutes of higher 
learning.  
Opponents may argue that there is no reason to create a contextual divide between 
race-preference policies in graduate schools and those in K-12 programs.  The Court 
could find that viewpoint diversity is helpful to students in public area grammar and high 
schools. In Grutter, the Court found that “the educational benefits that diversity was 
designed to produce were substantial, including to promote cross-racial understanding, to 
help break down racial stereotypes and to enable students to better understand persons of 
different races, to promote learning outcomes, to better prepare students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society and to better prepare students as 
professionals.”279 Clearly it is never too early to learn those lessons.  Alternatively, the 
Court could choose to find that the since there is no compelling interesting attaining 
viewpoint diversity in grades K-12 the programs do not pass constitutional muster.   
As recently as 2005, however, in the Johnson case, the Court reaffirmed its 
commitment to letting the context of a particular program drive a court’s evaluation.  The 
arguments in favor of distinguishing the context of diversity in grade schools – that they 
are designed to accomplish different programmatic goals, for one – seem most 
compelling and therefore necessitate that the Court consider plans that admit students to 
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various elementary and secondary schools in a context distinct from plans that admit 
students to institutes of higher education. 
Conclusion: 
The Court’s contextual approach to evaluating the constitutionality of race-
preference programs allows courts to tailor their decision making process to ensure that 
the societal goals of remaining a racially diverse society are fully achieved.  Arguably, 
the Court has already defined the compelling governmental interest test for challenged 
educational programs.  According to the Court, there is educational value in achieving 
viewpoint diversity in the classroom.  Challenged race-preference student assignment 
plans do no necessarily survive the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict 
scrutiny test,  when it is considered against the context of past Court decisions, which are 
limited to considering race-preference programs at the graduate level.  For this reason, 
the Court might have to strike down race-preference student assignment plans for school 
at theK-12 level. 
Striking down race-preference student assignment plans, however, will yield an 
undesirable result.  It will extinguish programs that secure educational equality to 
students in a particular district and threaten a return to de facto segregation.  For this 
reason, the Court should recognize educational programs at the elementary and secondary 
school level should be considered in a different context than programs at institutes of 
higher learning.   
It is perfectly appropriate and indeed justifiable for the Court to find a compelling 
governmental interest in preserving programs whose abolishment threatens a return to the 
de facto segregation the programs originally sought to cure.  Under this test, a court can 
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uphold a race-preference plan if the defending party can show that invalidating the plan 
would result in a return to the segregation or racial discrimination that existed before the 
government put the program in place.   
“Interpretation is a chameleon that takes its color from its context.”280  Where 
race-preference plans or programs are concerned, the Court has recognized that the 
context of a program can drive the result.  In this instance, the Court would be well 
advised to interpret the context of race-preference programs for grades K-12 as 
something wholly separate from that at the graduate level. Doing so would result in a 
continuation of the strides toward a color-blind society that school districts across the 
Country have fought so hard to achieve.   
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